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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action to enforce the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Nagle Construction, as Seller, and LeRoy Collard, as Buyer, dated March 30, 1978, 
for the sale of a condominium unit (hereinafter the "property"), which contract required that 
1 
the Buyer assume a mortgage loan on the property and convey to the Seller shares of stock 
or cash valued at $85,000 "before seller conveys title to premises sold to buyer." The 
interests of the Seller were later conveyed to defendants Gary M. Nagle and Marilyn F. 
Nagle (hereinafter the "Nagles") and the interests of the Buyer were later conveyed to 
plaintiff Kathryn Collard, Trustee of the LeRoy Collard Trust, (hereinafter "Collard"). 
Neither Collard nor her predecessor ever assumed the mortgage on the property or 
conveyed to Nagle the shares or cash valued at $85,000. LeRoy Collard, and later his son, 
took possession of the property and paid the monthly mortgage payments to the mortgage 
lender (without assuming the loan) until the time of suit. Because the shares or cash valued 
at $85,000 were never conveyed to Nagles, title to the property was never conveyed to 
Collard. 
Course of Proceedings 
Collard filed a complaint on July 28, 1999, alleging claims for breach of contract 
for failure to convey title to the property, adverse possession based on possession and 
payment of taxes and declaratory judgment to quiet title to the property based on an 
1 
allegation that Collard had "fulfilled all of the Buyer's obligations under the Contract." 
Nagles filed an answer and counterclaim denying that Buyer had fulfilled its obligations 
under the contract, asserting defenses of failure to state a claim, waiver, estoppel and the i 
statute of limitations of §§ 78-12-1 and 23, U.C.A. and asking in the alternative for a decree 
that Collard's interest in the property was forfeited, determining the amount due Nagles and 
for a decree of foreclosure against the property to satisfy the amount due and for a decree 
quieting title in Nagles. In her reply to the counterclaim Collard asserted various defenses 
including the statute of limitations but without referring to the statute "specifically and 
2 
definitely by section number" as required by Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Nagles file a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 24, 2000, and Collard filed a cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment on March 29, 2000. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
After oral arguments on July 17, 2000, the lower court, without making any 
findings of fact, ruled that "the statute of limitations operates to preclude both sides from 
exercising their rights under that contract" and asked the parties to brief the question of 
whether the court had "the equitable power . . . to order that the title be conveyed from 
Nagle to Collard." After briefing and further oral arguments on August 30, 2000, the lower 
court admitted difficulty in resolving this "perplexing problem" but ruled in favor of Collard 
and requested her counsel to prepare findings and conclusions acknowledging its decision 
"may well be subject to some question." Findings and conclusions and an order were 
prepared and objected to and after a hearing on those objections, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order were entered on November 6, 2000. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The real property involved in this action is a condominium unit located at 
3842 South Quail Hollow Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah described as Lot B-24, Cove Point-
Phase 1, a Planned Unit Development. [Complaint, If 5; Nagle Affidavit, 1f 1, Record 103]. 
2. Under date of March 30, 1978, Nagle Construction, as Seller, and LeRoy 
Collard, as Buyer, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract. [Complaint, 11 6; Nagle 
Affidavit, 1f 2; included as Exhibit B in the Addendum]. 
3. Pursuant to that contract the total purchase price was $100,500 payable 
$10,000 down and the balance of $90,500 was to be paid as follows: 
3 
Assumption by LeRoy Collard of a mortgage loan on the above 
described property in the principal amount of $59,958.75 presently 
payable by Nagle Construction Company to First Security bank and 
the balance of $30,541.26 is payable by delivery and conveyance to 
seller of 55,000 shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. Capital 
stock. The stock conveyed to seller is to be free of any 
encumbrances, liens or restrictions on trading. 
Title of said premises shall be delivered to buyer when seller has 
verified marketability of stock, conveyed and verified a market value 
sufficient to cover the unpaid balance. Such time is to be 
determined by seller but will not be unreasonably delayed. 
[Addendum # 1 to contract. See Exhibit A in Addendum.] 
4. On April 12, 1978, Nagle Construction conveyed the property to Gary M. 
Nagle. [Nagle Affidavit, 1111 6 & 7, Addendum, Exh. B; R. 112]. 
5. LeRoy Collard took possession of the property but did not assume the 
mortgage. Instead, he began making the mortgage payments directly to First Security Bank. 
[Nagle Affidavit, 11 9, Addendum, Exh. B; R. 104]. 
6. Later, LeRoy Collard tendered to Nagle 55,000 shares of stock but Nagle 
determined that the value of the stock was insufficient to cover the unpaid balance of the 
contract. [Nagle Affidavit, HH 6 and 7, Addendum, Exh. B; R. 104]. 
1 
7. LeRoy Collard told Nagle that he was sure the stock would go up in value 
and asked Nagle to hold off on declaring a default under the contract and further told him 
that he (Collard) would guarantee Nagle $85,000 from the sale of the stock if he would hold < 
off on exercising his default remedies. [Nagle Affidavit, 1111 12 and 13, Addendum, Exh. B; 
R. 105]. 
8. In furtherance of this guarantee, the parties executed Addendum #2 to the 
contract which provides as follows: 
4 
4 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above will 
be transferred when Nagle Construction Company sells sufficient of 
the shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. transferred under 
addendum # 1 to realize $85,000 cash. Seller hereby agrees to sell 
shares sufficient to realize $85,000 within 1 year of receipt thereof 
providing the market value of said shares will cause a realization of 
$85,000. 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 
within 1 year, buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal 
and Chemical Corp. stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
conveyed to seller to $85,000 before seller conveys title to premises 
sold to buyer. [Nagle Affidavit, Ml 14-17; Addendum, Exh. B; R. 
105]. 
9. The value of the stock was never such that $85,000 could be realized from 
the sale of the stock. [Nagle Affidavit, K 18, Addendum, Exh. B; R. 106]. In fact, the value 
of the stock during this time period ranged from a high of 1 3/8 to a low of $.05, never 
enough to realize $85,000. [R. 256, 287-88]. 
10. LeRoy Collard never did tender stock or cash sufficient to realize the 
$85,000. [Nagle Affidavit, MI 18-21, Addendum, Exh. B; R. 106]. 
11. Demand was made upon LeRoy Collard to deliver sufficient stock or the 
$85,000 [R. 11-12] but he failed to do so. 
12. LeRoy Collard, however, continued to pay the mortgage payments to First 
Security Bank leaving a balance due there of approximately $30,000 at the time this suit was 
filed. [Counterclaim, If 27; R. 32]. 
13. LeRoy Collard conveyed his interest in the property to Collard on January 
3, 1997, and died on February 8, 1997. [Complaint, UK 15 and 19; R. 3]. 
14. Collard filed a complaint on July 28, 1999, alleging claims for breach of 
contract for failure to convey title to the property, adverse possession based on possession 
5 
and payment of taxes and declaratory judgment to quiet title to the property based on an 
allegation that Collard had "fulfilled all of the Buyer's obligations under the Contract." [R. 
1-6]. 
15. Nagles filed an answer and counterclaim denying that Buyer had fulfilled its 
obligations under the contract, asserting defenses of failure to state a claim, waiver, estoppel 
and the statute of limitations of §§ 78-12-1 and 23, U.C.A. and asking in the alternative for 
a decree that Collard's interest in the property was forfeited, determining the amount due 
Nagles and for a decree of foreclosure against the property to satisfy the amount due and 
for a decree quieting title in Nagles. [R. 24-38]. 
16. In her reply to the counterclaim Collard asserted various defenses including \ 
the statute of limitations but without referring to the statute "specifically and definitely by 
section number" as required by Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 46-54]. 
17. Nagles file a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 24, 2000, [R. 84-
85] and Collard filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment on March 29, 2000. [R. 181-
82]. 
1 
18. After oral arguments on July 17, 2000, the lower court, without making any 
findings of fact, ruled that "the statute of limitations operates to preclude both sides from 
exercising their rights under that contract" and asked the parties to brief the question of i 
whether the court had "the equitable power . . . to order that the title be conveyed from 
Nagle to Collard." [Transcript of Hearing on July 17, 2000, R. 644, p. 24, lines 8-13, 
( 
Addendum, Exh. C]. 
19. After briefing and further oral arguments on August 30, 2000, the lower 
court admitted difficulty in resolving this "perplexing problem" but ruled in favor of Collard
 4 
6 
and requested her counsel to prepare findings and conclusions acknowledging its decision 
"may well be subject to some question." [Transcript of Hearing on August 30, 2000, R. 645, 
pp. 25-6, lines 1, 14-15, 19-20; Addendum, Exh. D]. 
20. Counsel for Collard prepared some one-sided Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order which [See Addendum, Exh. E]: 
(a) Attempted to sever the contract into three separate contracts or installments 
[See Finding #3]; 
(b) Failed to find that the contract had been amended by the addition of 
Addendum #2 to the contract requiring the payment of $85,000 in value and not $30,541.26 
[See Addendum, Exh. A, Addendum #2]; 
(c) Attempted to show that the 55,000 shares of stock could have been sold for 
$85,000 by submitting alleged brokerage information from a period of time (January-March, 
1979) prior to the time the stock was delivered (September, 1979) [R. 257] [See Finding 
#14]; 
(d) Failed to include a finding or conclusion, as stated by the lower court [See 
11 18, above], that the statute of limitations also barred Collard from enforcing the contract, 
based on her claim that she had performed all obligations under the contract in 1981 and 
knew that title had not been conveyed since at least 1986; 
(e) Made a conclusion that Nagle waived the requirement that Collard assume 
the mortgage at First Security Bank (See Conclusion #8) without any finding of fact to 
support it and without any evidence before the court upon which such a finding could be 
based. 
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21. Nagles objected to the proposed findings, conclusions and order and, after 
a hearing on those objections, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered 
on November 6, 2000. [Addendum, Exh. E]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR NAGLE 
FROM RECEIVING THE PURCHASE PRICE BEFORE HE IS 
OBLIGATED TO CONVEY TITLE. 
1. The Court should not have considered the statute of limitations 
defense asserted by Collard. 
Rule 9(h), U.R.C.P., requires that the statute of limitations be referred to in 
pleadings specifically and definitely by section number. Collard failed to do so and the cases 
hold that such failure bars the court from considering the statue. The lower court erred in 
holding that the inadequately pled statute applied in this case. 
2. The lower court, having determined that both parties were barred 
by the statute of limitations, should also have denied Collard a 
remedy. 
The lower court concluded that the statute of limitations barred both parties 
from pursuing their claims yet, inconsistently, allowed Collard a remedy while denying Nagle * 
a remedy. That conclusion requires either that both parties be denied a remedy or that 
equity provide a remedy that is fair to both sides. The court erred in failing to do so. 
i 
3. The lower court granted Collard specific performance, an 
equitable remedy, without requiring that Collard do equity. 
Because the lower court concluded that the statute of limitations barred both 
parties, it searched for an equitable remedy that would allow it to order title to be delivered 
to Collard. Its order required that Nagle specifically perform the contract by delivering title 
to Collard. Specific performance is an equitable remedy but it requires that equity be done 
8 
i 
by the party receiving it. That would require Collard to pay the purchase price. The lower 
court erred in failing to order Collard to do equity in return for equity by paying the 
purchase price. 
4. A counterclaim barred by the statute of limitations may still be 
used as an offset against plaintiffs claim for delivery of title. 
There is a long history of cases which hold that a counterclaim which might 
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations can still be asserted as an offset against the 
claim. This rule is obviously intended to avoid the inequity of allowing one party a remedy 
and denying a remedy to the other party when the claims arise out of the same transaction. 
That is exactly the case here where Collard is allowed to obtain title without requiring her 
to pay the purchase price for the property. The lower court erred in failing to require 
payment of the purchase price as an offset against the claim for title. 
5. Under the express words of the contract, payment of the purchase 
price is a condition precedent to delivery of title. 
The contract in this case expressly provided that the purchase price was to be 
paid before Nagle was required to convey title. Thus, payment of the purchase price was 
a condition precedent to conveyance of title. The law requires that the condition precedent 
be performed before the duty to convey title arises. The promise to convey title is 
dependent upon the promise to pay the purchase price. It was error for the lower court to 
separate one promise from the other. A condition precedent must precede. In this case it 
did not. 
6. The terms of the contract are not severable, either by separating 
the dependent promises or by dividing the consideration into three 
separate parts and applying the statute of limitations separately to 
each. 
9 
The contract in this case is not severable. It required delivery of title only in 
return for payment of the purchase price. Those dependent promises could not be severed 
nor could the payment of the purchase price be severed into parts for the purpose of barring 
payment of a portion thereof. To sever this contract would destroy its entire purpose, that 
is payment of the purchase price before title is to be delivered. The lower court erred in 
severing the dependent promises in this contract. 
POINT II. THE CONCLUSION THAT NAGLE WAIVED ASSUMPTION 
OF THE MORTGAGE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS 
AND IS A DISPUTED MATTER OF FACT WHICH COULD NOT 
BE DETERMINED ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and mere silence is not 
a waiver. The intent to waive a right must be determined from the totality of the 
circumstances. That was impossible in this case where there was no evidence on the issue 
of waiver and the decision was based on a motion for summary judgment. No facts are 
before the court with respect to waiver and, if there were such facts, they and all inferences 
therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to Nagle. The lower court failed to 
1 
do so. Furthermore, if Nagle did waive his right to have Collard assume the mortgage, then 
Collard's right to a deed arose in 1981 and is barred by the statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR NAGLE 
FROM RECEIVING THE PURCHASE PRICE BEFORE HE IS
 ( 
OBLIGATED TO CONVEY TITLE. 
The decision of the lower court in this case has effectively given the property to 
Collard without payment of the full purchase price. This windfall or gift is obviously unfair, 
10 
defeats the intent of the parties and is contrary to the terms of the contract and all 
principles of equity. It is no wonder that the lower court was "perplexed" and reluctant to 
rule in Collard's favor and confessed that its ruling "may well be subject to some question." 
[R. 645, p. 26, lines 19-20; Addendum, Exh. D]. Indeed, it is subject to many questions. 
Because the lower court ruled against Nagle on motions for summary judgment, it and this 
Court must "accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party." 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991), and it must determine that "no 
genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." S. W. Energy Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.. 974 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 
1999). This Court's review of the lower court's grant of summary judgment is "for 
correctness, according no deference to the court's legal conclusions." Thompson v. Jess, 979 
P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999). Thus, although there were contradictory claims made as to the 
value of the stock, it must be accepted as a fact that the stock was not worth the $85,000 the 
parties had agreed to1 and, therefore, Collard did not perform this essential term of the 
contract and had not completed payment of the purchase price. Since the contract clearly 
required the delivery of "stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value conveyed to seller 
to $85,000 before seller conveys title to premises sold to buyer," [Addendum, Exh. A, 
Addendum #2], one must wonder how the lower court could order the delivery of title 
before delivery of the $85,000 in stock or cash? The answer, of course, is that the court did 
not correctly apply the law or equity to this case. 
In fact, the lower court expressly refused to make a finding as to the value of the 
55,000 shares of stock at any point in time. [Finding #15, Addendum, Exh. E]. 
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The lower court based its decision on the statute of limitations claiming that 
Nagle could not enforce a claim of default years after the default occurred. This decision 
ignored several essential points of law and equity: 
1. The Court should not have considered the statute of limitations 
defense asserted by Collard. 
Collard had not properly raised the statute of limitations as a defense since she 
did not refer to the statute in her Reply to Counterclaim "specifically and definitely by 
section number" as required by Rule 9(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 46-54]. That 
is an inadequate plea and should not have been considered by the lower court. Wasatch 
Mines Co. v. Hopkinson. 24 U.2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), is a case in which a 
general plea of the statute of limitations was considered by the trial court resulting in a 
dismissal of plaintiffs claim, but that dismissal was reversed on appeal because the statute 
of limitations was not referred to "specifically and definitely by section number" as required 
by Rule 9(h). Likewise, the lower court here should not have considered the statute of 
limitations since it was not adequately pled. That is reason enough to reverse the lower 
court as did the court in Wasatch Mines. i 
2. The lower court, having determined that both parties were barred 
by the statute of limitations, should also have denied Collard a 
remedy. 
i 
Although Collard's attorney, in preparing and submitting written findings and 
conclusions to the court, failed to include a specific conclusion to that effect, the lower court 
made that conclusion in its ruling from the bench [R. 644, p. 24, lines 9-11; Addendum, Exh. < 
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C].2 It, therefore, should have also denied Collard a remedy and dismissed her claims. This 
inconsistency only underlines the unfairness and inequitable nature of its decision and 
suggests that the court misapplied the law. 
It is interesting to note that Collard's attorney argued to the lower court that an 
equitable remedy was available in the event both were barred by the statute of limitations. 
He said: 
. . . the real question is that if we had performed back in 1981, and 
like Mr. Thurman's quotes from Kathryn Collard indicate, Mr. 
Collard said "I did everything I was suppose [sic] to do. I gave them 
the stock. I gave them the money. I did everything I was suppose 
[sic] to do under that contract." He argues that at that point, we had 
six years to then demand title. I believe the court in equity if the 
undisputed facts clearly showed that we paid the money, gave the 
stock and performed under the contract, this Court would probably 
not say, "Gosh, you only had six years to ask for title and now I'm 
not going to give it to you even though you received the full benefit 
of the performance." I think it's pretty clear the Court would be 
inclined to say, "You got what you bargained for. Give them the 
title." So I don't see that as you know, a tit for tat. If the statute 
applies to one it applies to the other. [R. 644, p. 15-16, lines 15-25, 
1-5]. 
I'm just saying as equitable argument, it's kind of a stretch to say 
that if we had performed and we can show we performed, that 
because we didn't act in six years we don't deserve title. [R. 644, p. 
16, lines 19-22]. 
2
 Collard's attorney acknowledged that double finding as he commenced his argument 
to the lower court at the August 30, 2000, hearing. He stated, "In the prior motion for 
summary judgment hearing the Court determined that the 1979 Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between Collards and Nagles was, essentially any claims of the parties were barred 
by the six year statute of limitations. The Court then inquired of the parties whether or not 
under, given that ruling, whether or not the Court could compel Mr. Nagle to transfer title 
to Mr. Collard and asked for additional briefing, specifically addressing that issue." [R. 645, 
p. 1, lines 13-21]. 
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Collard was clearly arguing that if she was barred by the statute of limitations, in all fairness, 
the court would find an equitable way to require that title be delivered anyway. Why doesn't 
that same argument apply to Nagle? If he is barred by the statute of limitations from 
collecting the balance due under the contract, "it's kind of a stretch to say that if we had 
performed" by delivering title, "that because we didn't act in six years we don't deserve" to 
be paid the purchase price. "It's pretty clear the Court would be inclined to say, 'You got 
what you bargained for [the deed]. Give them [the purchase price].'" "Tit for tat. If the 
statute applies to one it applies to the other." 
The lower court and the parties were looking for an equitable way to resolve this 
"painful and vexatious" [R. 644, P. 23, line 13; Addendum, Exh. C] issue. But equity requires 
equity in return, which is the next point. 
3. The lower court granted Collard specific performance, an 
equitable remedy, without requiring that Collard do equity. 
Because the court concluded that the statute of limitations also barred Collard's 
claims [R. 644, p.24, lines 9-11], it searched for an equitable way to require delivery of title. 
If both parties were legally barred from enforcing their claims and equity provided a remedy, 1 
that remedy must be equitable on both sides. Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984) 
[Parties who seek equity must do equity]. Requiring Nagle to deliver title without requiring 
i 
Collard to pay the purchase price is not equitable. The lower court's order that Nagle 
deliver title to Collard was, in effect, a decree of specific performance requiring Nagle to 
specifically perform the contract by delivery of title. As stated in Fischer v. Johnson, 525 
P.2d 45, 46 (Utah 1974), where specific performance was denied because plaintiff had failed 
to tender his own performance: 
i 
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". . . specific performance is a remedy of equity; and one who 
invokes it must have clean hands in having done equity himself. 
That is, he must take care to discharge his own duties under the 
contract; . . . 
Collard is simply not entitled to delivery of a deed in this case where a substantial portion 
of the purchase price has not been paid. Equity demands that she pay the purchase price 
first rather than allow her to "steal" the property. The contract required payment of $85,000 
in value which has not been paid. She must do equity in order to receive it. Equity requires 
at least an offset [See Point 4 below], that in order to receive title to the property, she must 
pay the value of the portion of the property for which she has not paid, which might require 
an appraisal of the property, or she must pay the current value of the unpaid portion of the 
purchase price, that is, the $85,000 plus interest thereon. 
4. A counterclaim barred by the statute of limitations may still be 
used as an offset against plaintiffs claim for delivery of title. 
A defendant may utilize a counterclaim, normally barred by the statute of 
limitations, to offset a plaintiffs claim. Thus, in Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072 
(Utah App. 1996), a wife with a time-barred claim for unpaid child support was allowed to 
offset that claim against the husband's claim to collect a lien on the marital home. The 
court stated, at 1072: 
A defendant may therefore utilize a counterclaim, normally 
barred by the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiffs claim, but 
only to the extent the claims equal each other. 
Likewise, in Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah 1985), two sisters who had 
borrowed money from their father on promissory notes and inherited shares of the balance 
due on each note after the father's death, brought suit to collect the balance due. The claim 
of one was barred by the statute of limitations but she was, nevertheless, allowed to offset 
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that claim against the claim of the other. Further, Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 
82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281 (Utah 1932), held that if a defendant had a counterclaim that 
otherwise would have been barred by a statute of limitations, the counterclaim could be set-
off against the plaintiffs claim, notwithstanding the statute of limitations. The court in both 
of these latter cases relied upon what is now Rule 13(i), U.R.C.P., which provides: 
When cross demands have existed between persons under such 
circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, 
a counterclaim could have been set up, the two demands shall be 
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other. . . . 
Thus, Nagle's counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations since the claim for the 
purchase price may be offset against the claim for title. Since the claim for title is not 
monetary, the amount of the offset can be determined either by an evaluation of the 
property to determine the maximum amount of the offset or by determining the current 
value of the unpaid portion of the purchase price, that is, the $85,000 plus interest. A more 
reasonable approach, however, is that the claims of the parties are equal and one does not 
exceed the other. The agreement of the parties was that Nagle would deliver title in return 
for payment of the full purchase price--the consideration on one side equalling the 
consideration on the other. Therefore, the counterclaim does not exceed the claim and can 
be offset against it. That simply requires payment of the balance due, with interest, in return 
for delivery of a deed. 
5. Under the express words of the contract, payment of the purchase 
price is a condition precedent to delivery of title. 
The contract in this case provides in Addendum #2 [See Addendum, Exh. A]: 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 
within 1 year buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal 
and Chemical Corp. stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
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conveyed to seller to $85,000 before seller conveys title to premises 
sold to buyer. [Emphasis added]. 
The promise to deliver title under the contract is dependent upon payment of the purchase 
price and payment of the purchase price is a condition precedent to the obligation to deliver 
title. Payment of the purchase price must be made before the obligation to convey title 
arises. In Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council. Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah 1999), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a condition precedent must be satisfied before a duty to 
perform arises. The court stated, at 1217: 
Under well-established principles of contract interpretation, where 
the duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence 
or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not require 
performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, and 
conversely the obligee's right to demand performance, does not arise 
until that condition occurs or exists. 
In this case, Collard was in breach of the contract by failing to pay the balance of the 
purchase price and failing to assume the mortgage. In Jackson v. Rich, 28 U.2d 134, 499 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not sue because 
he was in breach of the contract himself. The court stated, at 280-1: 
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of 
contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to 
perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party 
nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent 
failure to perform. At least, the party first committing aa substantial 
breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other 
contracting party for a subsequent failure to perform if the promises 
are dependent. It has also been said that where a contract is not 
performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach is generally the 
one upon whom rests all the liability for the nonperformance. 
[Quoting from 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts §365]. 
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On the other hand, a buyer who tenders his performance under a contract can obtain 
specific performance against a defaulting seller. Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 
P.2d 1238 (Utah 1992), in which the court stated: 
Neither party to an agreement "can be said to be in default (and 
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for specific 
performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance." Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56. In other words, "a party 
must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put 
the other party in default." Id.; see also Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 
45, 46-7 (Utah 1974). 
The tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition 
or requirement not already imposed by the contract. . . . If the law 
were otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other party to 
comply with new contractual terms. 
< 
Nagle's obligation to deliver a deed simply does not arise until the purchase price has been 
paid in full. Since that obligation is dependent upon payment of the purchase price and 
payment of the purchase price is a condition precedent to delivery of the deed, that 
i 
dependency and contingency cannot be eliminated by a one-sided application of the statute 
of limitations. 
6. The terms of the contract are not severable, either by separating i 
the dependent promises or by dividing the consideration into three 
separate parts and applying the statute of limitations separately to 
each. 
Whether a contract is severable depends on the intent of the parties at the time < 
they entered the contract. Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 328 (Utah 1992) [Holding a 
contract for snow removal services for one year not severable into separate contracts related 
to each snowfall]. In Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan School District, 560 P.2d 
1129,1131 (Utah 1977), the court held a contract with a teacher who was to teach classes 
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and coach athletic teams was a contract for a teacher-coach and not a severable contract for 
a teacher or a coach. The court stated: 
This court has repeatedly addressed itself to the question of 
severability of agreements and the enforceability of the parts if 
severable. Fundamental to such considerations are basic contract 
principles as to the parties' intent which is derived from looking at 
the entire contract and the relationship of the parts to the whole and 
whether it was intended that the total agreement be severable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has even held that a contract which contains a severance clause 
is not severable if the primary purpose of the contract could not be accomplished following 
severance. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah 1996) [Holding that provisions of the 
contract were unconscionable and could not be severed from the contract because that 
would allow the defendant the benefit of his unconscionable behavior]. 
In the contract in this case, there is no severance clause in the contract and the 
contract cannot be severed without destroying its entire purpose, that is, the sale of real 
property in return for payment of the full purchase price. As already indicated, the parties 
clearly provided that payment of the purchase price was to be made in full before title to 
the property was to be conveyed. [Addendum, Exh. A, Addendum #2]. The contract 
further contains this language in paragraph 18: 
The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid 
at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to execute 
and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty 
deed conveying the title to the above described premises . . . . 
The intent of the parties, as determined from the entire contract, was clearly that title was 
to be conveyed only after payment of the entire purchase price and that entire purchase 
price, the consideration for conveyance of the title, could not be severed into separate parts 
or installments and apply the statute of limitations to those parts separately. Collard had 
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clearly not performed by paying the full purchase price both by failing to deliver the $85,000 
and by failing to assume the mortgage. She continued to make the payments on the 
mortgage and was not entitled to a deed during that entire period.3 She can only support 
her position by dividing this non-severable contract into separate parts and claim the statute 
of limitations has expired with respect to those separate parts. But a contract for the 
purchase of real property providing for conveyance of title only after payment of the 
purchase price in full cannot be so divided. The purchase price has not been paid until all 
parts of it have been paid. Because Collard had not fully performed4, Nagle was entitled 
to wait until she wanted a deed and then insist on full and final performance of this non-
severable contract. This argument only underscores the principles stated above:
 { 
(a) that the statute of limitations, if it applies, it applies to both 
parties; 
(b) that the statute of limitations does not bar an offset, that is, that my 
consideration can be offset against your consideration, that my performance 
depends upon your performance, that your condition precedent must be 
performed before my performance is due; 
(c) that my obligation to deliver a deed cannot be severed from your obligation 
to pay the purchase price; < 
3
 If she were entitled to a deed previously, she failed to assert that right until after the 
statute of limitations had expired with respect to that right. Thus, the lower court's 
conclusion that the statute of limitations barred both parties from asserting their rights would 
become relevant and conclusive against her position. 
4
 The lower court recognized this when it required that Collard pay off the balance due 
on the First Security Mortgage before it could order delivery of title. [Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order, p. 9, 11 3; Addendum, Exh. D]. < 
20 
i 
(d) that if you want equity, you must do equity, that, if you want specific 
performance, an equitable remedy, you must also perform and pay the 
consideration due for the deed. 
POINT II 
THE CONCLUSION THAT NAGLE WAIVED ASSUMPTION 
OF THE MORTGAGE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS 
AND IS A DISPUTED MATTER OF FACT WHICH COULD NOT 
BE DETERMINED ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Conclusion No. 8 states that "Nagle's continued acceptance of Collard's method 
of performance . . . operated as a waiver of the strict assumption requirements of the 
contract. While there is a finding that Collard made payments to First Security Bank, 
Finding No. 19, there is no finding that Nagle accepted or continued to accept that 
procedure. And there is no evidence before the Court to indicate that Nagle accepted or 
continued to accept that procedure. Since this case was decided on a motion for summary 
judgment, all facts which support that judgment must be without dispute and all facts and 
inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the losing party. Energy Corp. 
and Wine gar, supra. The absence of any testimony with respect to waiver bars the court 
from making findings and conclusions with respect to that issue. The Utah Supreme Court, 
in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) has held that: 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. . . . We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a 
right must be distinct. 
The Court went on to state that: 
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. . . intent may be more difficult to prove when waiver is to be 
implied from conduct or silence. Consistent with this point is the 
general principle in our case law that M[m]ere silence is not a waiver 
unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." Plateau Mining 
Co., 802 P.2d at 730, quoted in Rees, 808 P.2d at 1073. 
. . . we indicated that a fact finder should assess the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly 
intended. See Morgan, 704 P.2d at 578; see also Barnard v. 
Wassermann. 855 P.2d 243, 246-47 (Utah 1993). 
Without some evidence in this case upon which the lower court could determine that Nagle 
had intentionally and distinctly relinquished his right to have Collard assume the mortgage, 
a conclusion to that effect was inappropriate. The court could not "assess the totality of the 
circumstances" without an evidentiary hearing on the matter. That would be impossible on 
a motion for summary judgment where that issue was not even raised until after the court 
made its decision.
 { 
Furthermore, if it were assumed that Nagle waived the requirement that Collard 
assume the mortgage, it does not necessarily follow that he agreed to an amendment of the 
contract that would allow Collard to just make payments to First Security Bank until the 
mortgage was paid off. It may be more logical to conclude that a waiver of the assumption 
requirement was simply that, a waiver of assumption, and that the mortgage would be 
treated as Collard's mortgage which he could pay as he determined and that his duty to 
Nagle was complete at that point in time. To hold otherwise is to create a new contract for 
the parties since their contract did not state that Collard would be allowed to simply pay the < 
mortgage payments without assumption. This more logical position means that Collard's 
22 
( 
duties under the contract5 were complete in 1981 and that his right to a deed arose at that 
point in time. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired in 1987 with respect to his right 
to a deed. This is the dilemma the lower court found itself in when it determined that the 
statute of limitations barred the rights of both parties. It attempted to resolve this dilemma 
by concluding, without evidence to support that conclusion, that Nagle must have waived the 
assumption requirement of the contract and amended their contract so that payments to the 
bank would be considered payments to Nagle to keep only that portion of the contract alive. 
Nagle obviously would not have intended such a result6 and it was totally inappropriate for 
the lower court to so conclude without an evidentiary hearing on those issues. On this 
motion for summary judgment, all inferences on these matters must be in favor of Nagle. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in this case must be reversed because the lower court erred in 
applying the law with respect to the statute of limitations. It should not have considered the 
statute which Collard failed to plead as required by the rules. If the statute applies to Nagle, 
it also applies to Collard, as the court concluded. The court granted an equitable remedy 
to Collard without requiring that she do equity by paying the full purchase price. Nagle's 
counterclaim, even if barred, may still be used as an offset against Collard's claim for title, 
5
 Ignoring the obligation to pay $85,000 in value and the statute of limitations arguments 
in Point I. 
6
 Nagle clearly had no intention to sever this assumption portion of the contract from 
the requirement that Collard pay the $85,000 and keep the former alive while allowing the 
latter to die. This contract was not severable by its terms and there was no evidence to 
indicate an intent to sever. [See the argument in Point I (6), above]. Rather, because the 
contract clearly required payment of the purchase price as a condition precedent to delivery 
of a deed [See Point I (5), above], Nagle was not unreasonable in expecting that Collard 
would have to pay the purchase price at the time he wanted a deed. 
23 
thus requiring the consideration for the deed to be paid. Payment of the purchase price was 
a condition precedent to delivery of the deed and those dependent covenants may not be 
severed to force compliance with one without reciprocal compliance with the other. 
The court's conclusion that Nagle waived the assumption requirement was 
without a supporting finding and without supporting evidence. There is no evidence on this 
issue and on a motion for summary judgment all material facts must be without dispute and 
all facts and inferences must be considered in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
The lower court's decision in this case must be reversed. 
DATED this J_ day of August, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B A C p i A N . C L ^ K & MARSH 
By. 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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"THIS IS >. LSSAitr 5 : N O : S S CONTACT. != SC" 'JNO.^STCCO. SS:< C O M » = 7 . N T A^VIC:." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this ~ ^ r day of ^ 7 7 / ^ ''^ Sli* A . D., \9-J±-U, 
by and between Nagle Construction Company Inc. 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and U R o y C o l l a i d ^Bh2 q u a i l Hol low Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of One COndc.ldniim U n i t ( n o . B - 2 - ) i n Cove P o i n t 
a Planned Conrounity Development 38^2 Quail Hollow Dr. SLC, UT 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Salt Lake state of Utah, to-wit: VL2 Quail Hollow Dr. SLCt UT 
AOOftCSS 
More particularly described as follows: 
Condominium unit no. B-24( a Planned Ur.it Development) 
Legal Description: 
All of Lot B^24 Cove Point Phase One a Planned Unit Development according to the 
Official Plat thereof, dated May 13, 1976 filed and recorded May 26, 1976 in 
Book 76-5 page 118 records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Together with a l l rights and responsibilities of membership in the Cove Point 
Homes Association, a nonprofit corporation as provided in the articles of 
Corporation, Bylaws, Declaration of Covenants, conditions and restrictions 
dated. May 1% 1976 and.recorded May 26, 1576 «n §cpk 1212 rages ?77-2S7.fw 
3. Said Tfcayernereoy agrees to enter into posstsstorr anc pay Tor sauTuescriDeu premises the Sum of ,Vue Hundred Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (? 100,500.00 ^ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order ! 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: Ten IfrWgand P c l l a r S _ ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ ffiwQO'QQ shall be paid as follows: 
per attached: 
cont'd. Legal Description-
records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Subject to all of the Covenants, Conditions, Bestrictions, and easements contained 
and set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions dated 
May 13, 1976 and recorded May 26, 1976 in Book 4212 page 277-2S7 records of 
Salt lake County, State of Utah, 
r*os%ei*ioft c* s*<f^rihnfte^s«all^e*de1\Yfre#t#b#ye* o* HU» » • » » « » Av»nf» » » » » » » » » tiJL*. 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of per cent ( r\) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will m no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 





 with an unpaid balance of 
$ 59f958.75 ,«*** which buyer will assume 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following : 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the princijLaVdue hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject tn **id linn* *nA r-.Artg-.y*'?. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price *hove mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 







12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after -7 (7 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
| j pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or J_ 
' I l l t H tn a « « i r > « ! «9t«4 i n t l i n n M t r\ t\*m C A I I A * - • « Vita t* . , ara>ar» *•• * «• a n ^ ^ a v a toJ » A I 4 < I ! U » » k > : « • • • • > • «L»ai n/tl<'/.< and to ssign said i sura ce to the Seller as his interests may ppe r nd to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and it Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from daw of payment of said sums at the rate of £ of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
15. In the event of a failure to comply with the cerrr.s hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
. days thereafter, the any payment or payments when the same shall become due. or within 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with si! improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the Land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty de«d conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at hb expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, a: the option of Buyer. 
CO. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the z*nits hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21. The Buyer and Seiler each agree that should ir.ey defauh in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party snail pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining- possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the Sta:e of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
i./,PvU; Q yV r-cT\ 
^ Y 
?la?le Construction Company Inc. 
' Vnc ^ "^^CS>?A Pfafr 


















To Real Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Conpnay and 
LeRoy Collard. Dated - ?S ?(? ir/*' • '><"- ' c's 7$ 
Paragraph 3 
Balance ox* Sales price cue of $90,500.00 shall be paid as follows: 
Assumption by LeRoy Collard of a ciartgage loan on 
the above described property in the principal amount 
of $59
 f953,75 presently payable by Nagle Construction 
Company to First Security Bank and the balance of 
$30,541.26 i s payable by delivery and conveyance to 
se l ler of 551000 shares of Utah Coal and Checdcal Corp. 
Capital stock. The stock conveyed to seller i s to 
be free of any encumbrances, l iens or restrictions 
on trading. 
Title of said prerrises shall be delivered to buyer 
when seller has verified marketability of stock, 
conveyed and verified a carket .value sufficient 
to cover the unpaid balance. Such tice i s to be 
detennined by sel ler but will not be unreasonably 
delayed. 
\ , «~N . • \ Nagle Construction Consanv -
W'i y 7 
.,;'•••• JS/7 
•-._,• i >*-(<-ij.ftcIf-
Buyer ( f 
M% 
Addendum #2 
To Real Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Company and LeRoy 
Collard. Dated • • >*•?.•:>**: r?r .'^'A-C 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above will 
be transferred when Nagle Construction Company sells sufficient of the 
shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. transferred under addendum #1 
to realize $85,000 cash. Seller hereby agrees to sell shares sufficient 
to realize $85,000 within 1 year of receipt thereof providing the 
market value of said shares will cause a realization of $85,000. 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 within 
1 year buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal and 
Chemical Corp. Stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
conveyed to seller to $85,000.before seller conveys title to prendses 
eold to buyer. 
. Nagle Construction Company. 






William Thomas Thurman (3269) 
Lynn B. Larsen (3906) 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
600 Gateway Tower East 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
Attorneys for Defendants 
"?• nc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE of the 
LeRoy Collard Trust, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, GARY M. NAGLE, an 
individual, MARILYN F. NAGLE, an 
individual. 
AFFDDAVIT OF GARY M. 
NAGLE IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants. Civil No. 990907648 
Judge William B. Bohling 
GARY M. NAGLE, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE of the 
LeRoy Collard Trust, 
Counterclaim-Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Gary M. Nagle, being first duly sworn, depose and state; 
I am a defendant and counter-claimant in this action. The following is based on my 
personal knowledge. I called upon to do so I would so testify under penalty in a court of law. 
1. This is a quiet title action concerning a condominium unit located at 3842 South 
Quail Hollow Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah in the Cove Point condominiums, (the "Property") 
legally described as follows: 
Lot B-24, COVE POINT - PHASE 1, a Planned Unit Development, according 
to the official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
Together with an easement for use and enjoyment in and to the common areas 
and facilities, including but not limited to roadways and access ways 
appurtenant to said lot, as provided in the Declaration of COVE POINT -
PHASE 1. 
Parcel identification: 16-36-306-006 
2. On or about March 30, 1978, LeRoy Collard ("Collard") and I on behalf of 
Nagle Construction, Inc. executed the Uniform Real Estate Contract ("Contract"), attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. Pursuant to the Contract, the total purchase price for the Property was to be the 
sum of $100,500.00. 
4. $10,000 of the Original Purchase Price was paid at or prior to the closing on 
March 30, 1978, as noted in paragraph 2 of the Contract. 
2 
5. The remaining $90,500 of the Original Purchase Price, as referenced in 
paragraph 2 of the Contract and as provided in Addendum #1 to the Contract, was to be paid 
as follows: 
Assumption by LeRoy Collard of a mortgage loan on the above 
described property in the principal amount of $59,958.75 
presently payable by Nagle Construction Company to First 
Security Bank and the balance of $30,541.26 is payable by 
delivery and conveyance to seller of 55,000 shares of Utah Coal 
and Chemical Corp. Capital stock. The stock conveyed to seller 
is to be free of any encumbrances, liens or restrictions on 
trading. 
Title of said premises shall be delivered to buyer when seller has 
verified marketability of stock, conveyed and verified a market 
value sufficient to cover the unpaid balance. Such time is to be 
determined by seller but will not be unreasonably delayed. 
6. Shortly after entering into the Contract, Nagle Construction executed a 
Warranty Deed conveying the Property to Nagle, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
7. This Warranty Deed was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on April 12, 1978 at Book 4654, Page 141. 
8. On or about April 12, 1978, I and Marilyn F. Nagle, executed a Deed of Trust in 
favor of First Security Bank of Utah, NA in the principal amount of $60,000.00 which was 
recorded on that same date. 
9. Collard took possession of the Property. Thereafter Collard did not assume the 
mortgage but did began making the mortgage payments directly to First Security Bank. His 
family or someone on Collard is still making such payments, I believe. 
3 
10. Collard tendered 55,000 shares of stock to me in an apparent effort to comply 
with Addendum #1. 
11. After some time had elapsed, I determined that I would not be able to realize 
$30,541.26 from the 55,000 shares of stock ("Stock") Collard tendered to me in an effort to 
comply with the requirements of the Contract. 
12. Collard told me that he was sure that the Stock would go up in value and asked me 
to hold off exercising any of his default remedies under the Contract. 
13. Collard told me that he was so sure that the Stock would go up in value that he 
would guaranty me a realization of $85,000 from the sale of the stock if I would just hold ofFon 
exercising my default remedies. 
14. In furtherance of his proposal, Collard proposed Addendum #2 to the Contract. 
15. I agreed to hold off on exercising my default remedies in exchange for the 
modification reflected in Addendum #2. 
16. Both Collard and I executed Addendum #2 and thereby modified the terms of the 
Contract. 
17. Addendum #2 modified the total purchase price of the Property and my obligation 
to deliver title to the Property as follows: 
Title of premises being sold under the contract referred to above 
will be transferred when Nagle Construction Company sells 
sufficient of the shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. 
transferred under addendum #1 to realize $85,000 cash. Seller 
_ hereby agrees to sell shares sufficient to realize $85,000 within 1 
year of receipt thereof providing the market value of said shares 
will cause a realization of $85,000. 
4 
Should the value of the 55,000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 
within 1 year, buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal 
and Chemical Corp. stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
conveyed to seller to $85,000 before seller conveys title to premises 
sold to buyer. 
18. The value of the Stock never rose to the point that I could realize $85,000 from 
the sale of the 55,000 shares. 
19. At some point, as referred to in the 1981 letter from my counsel to Collard which 
the Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to her Complaint, Collard offered to purchase 55,000 shares of 
the Stock for $85,000. Collard failed to honor this offer. He never provided the $85,000. 
20. In 1981,1 made demand upon Collard to deliver additional shares of the Stock or 
cash sufficient to enable Nagle to realize $85,000. 
21. Collard never tendered sufficient Stock and/or cash to me so as to enable me to 
realize $85,000. 
22. Upon Collard's default under the Contract, I understand that I have the option of 
pursuing any of the three alternative remedies provided under paragraph 16: 
A. if the Buyer fails to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
the Seller has the right to be released from his obligations under the 
Contract, to have all prior payments forfeited by the Buyer as liquidated 
damages for non-performance, and the Seller "may at his option re-enter 
and take possession" of the Property without legal process, "the Buyer 
becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller," see Contract % 16(A); 
B. the Seller can bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent 
installments, including costs and attorneys fees, see Contract |^ 16(B); or 
C. the Seller has the right "at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, 
to declare the entire unpaid balance . . . at once due and payable, and may 
elect to treat th[e C]ontract as a note and mortgage, and pass title to the 
5 
Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah . . . " see Contract ^ 16(C). 
23. Collard never complied with the Contract and I never furnished a deed to 
Collard. 
24. Pursuant to the option given in paragraph 16 A, I want the Property back 
Signed this & day of February, 2000. 
Gary M. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Gary M Nag^ tjtfs £$ day of 
February, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CARLA B. BELNAP 
3885 South Wasatch Blvd. 
S.LC.UT 84109 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
APRIL 25, 2001 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /?<ffi day of February, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the AFFIDAVIT OF GARY M. NAGLE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, as follows: 
Bradley R. Helsten 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
oK.deA*Ubul(U^ 
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-7H:S IS >. LSGAILY »:NO:NS CONTACT. Is NC" JNOitSTCCO. $£=< COM»£7£NT ACVIC- ' 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this * ~<S day mrm^T7'A^'i.'^Cu
 A . D„ i q 7*S 
by and between Nagle Construction Company Inc . ' 
hereinafter d e b a t e d as the Seller, and l>ROY C o l l a r d 1SL2 Quai l Hollow Dr. ,. 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84109 _ _ _ 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of one condc.Tlniu.-n unit (no. B-2/Q in Cove Point 
a Planned Community Development J8LZ Quail Hollow Dr. SLC, UT 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Sellert for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following: described real property, situate in 
the county of S a l t Lake
 t suit of Utah, to-wit: 18L2 Quail Hollow Dr. SLC. UT 
AOOUCSS 
More particularly described as follows: 
Condominium unit no. B-24( a Planned Unit Development) 
Legal Description: 
All of Lot B-24 Cove Point Phase One a Planned ttdt Development according to the 
Official Plat thereof, dated May 13, 1976 filed and recorded May 26, 1976 in 
Book 76-5 page 118 records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Together with a l l rights and responsibilities of membership in the Cove Point 
Homes Association, a nonprofit corporation as provided in the articles of 
Corporation, Bylaws, Declaration of Covenants,*conditions and restrictions 
W$U%&iJ&^Jua&& £&& .£?& ft ,!ia*jy&§ .SMS!. m^M-ste-
8. The Seller is fiven the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to **r*+A — percent 
( %) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregste monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be freater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to ««id Man* «nW m*rtpg*s. 
9. If the Buyer desires.to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of tail agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required o« prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property moored by teller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations arc assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan, of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase prist above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreefeg to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, anal! not exceed the monthly payments and Interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises daring the life of this agreement The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
•fes that there are no assessments against said premises except the following? 
l't'\, _• 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default In the paiifttat of Us obligations against said property. 
^ . l ^ ^ i ^ i ^ A W ; •'.»* - H ^ , . -. . . v ^ i ., . . . '1.1. ** . - n. — 
Hundred Thousand Five Hundred Dollars /t*°Q» 500*00
 } 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order * * * * * * * * * * * 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: Ten Thousand Dollars #«. 10 ,000.00 > 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of * 9 0 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows: 
per a t tached:
 x., 
cont'd. Legal Description- " ! ! 
records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. j j 
Subject t o a l l of the Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and easements contained i ! 
and set forth in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions dated ? 
May 13, 1976 and recorded Kay 26, 1976 in Book 4212 page 277-267 records of j 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, J ; 
Joile^ioft c* s*c^>rifmftei*s«hll»be^ie1lTe\t# td*be>e* o* die » » • » » « « A«*»r» * * * * * * * * r*. * * \ I 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of per cent ( %) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, H will m no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of F i r s t S e c u r i t y 
Bank ^ j ,
 aft anpaid balance o( 
% 59t95S«75 **** which buver w i l l assume
 : 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following : 
I 
Emscr'tA* Icrt 
j. J 12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after 1 9 7 7 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on amid premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or * 
ana to assign said inaurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or genera] taxes, assessment* or insurance 
premiums as n«rein provided, the Seller may. at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. * 
% 15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste. spoO, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and tbat he will maintain said premises in good condition, 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with tbe terms hereof by the Bayer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A " 
days thereafter, the 
B 
. Seller shall hare the nght, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. <Thc use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's Iet%; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
* *-' 18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
rtferred to, or in the event any lien's or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acta or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
menu herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acta or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during tne 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties Hereto witn 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _ ... — 
zi. Tne Buyer ana seller eacn agree tnat snouia uiey aeiauu in any oi uie covenants or ^ ' ^ " ' ^ w WUH^^H . 
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including, a reasonable attorney's fee, wnicfc may i 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining- possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing 




21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
+1..+ +i* *^««t«u%_«» •»»»«-«/ •v.oit «**tr ail rnire ort/4 ivninfM. intruding. * reasonable attorney s fee, which may -*-«*«
rtf tVi. nMRiiu* covered herebv. or in nursuing 
_ _ _ suit 
or ot er ise. 
22, Jt is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sue 
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of 
forfUxq.xV\U\ojP\ 
\^m%'t 
Nagle CmgtnictiQn Compamr..Inc, 
'-y^Wffp: 
( , . _ • . . .Buyer 
c: 
I • I 1 o 
I 1 3 
i l l 
Addendum #1 
To Beal Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Cornpnay and 
LeHoy Collard. Dated -• *?S ?£?%«/*- . '/<'\ ' O 7U 
Paragraph 3 . 
Balance of Sales price due of $90*500.00 shall be paid as 
follows: 
Assumption by LeBqy Collard of a martgage loan on 
the above described property in the principal amount 
of $59?95S#75 presently payable by Jfegle Construction 
Conf>any to first Security Bank and the balance of 
$30,541*26 is payable by delivery and conveyance to 
seller of 55$ 000 shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp. 
Capital stock. The stock conveyed to seller is to 
be free of any encumbrances! liens or restrictions 
on trading. 
!ELtle of said premises shall be delivered to buyer 
when seller has verified marketability of stock* 
conveyed and verified a market value sufficient 
to cover the unpaid balance* Such time is to be 
determined by seller but will not be unreasonably 
delayed. 
_ii^  
Nagle Coostructipn Copp&ny • 







To Real Estate Contract between Nagle Construction Conpany and LeRoy 
Collard. Dated - - > t'Oti'-i**}. 7?<r .'~/7S 
W-tie of premises being sold under the contract referred to above will 
be transferred when Nagle Construction Company sells sufficient of the 
shares of Utah Coal and Chemical Corp* transferred under addendum #1 
to realize $35f000 cash. Seller herein agrees to sell shares sufficient 
to realize $85*000 within 1 year of receipt thereof providing the 
marJcet value of said shares will cause a realization of $85f000# 
Should the value of the $5$000 shares conveyed not equal $85,000 within 
l..year. buyer agrees to convey additional shares of Utah Coal and 
Chemical Corp. Stock or cash sufficient to bring the total value 
conveyed to seller to $85f000* before seller conveys title to premises 
sold to buyer* 
Witness '^ V 
Nagle C o ^ r u c t i o n C 
^-K&ftfs?/V&f 
Seller.'./, /' / 
-J ) ' / " 
Buyer 
" •"% ^f/^Sfti/ 
I'Ai 
••!. 
:XoatiKo# 24687»01»A :T••# ^ v ^ ' K w " V Cary K, Kagle % • < 7 - ^ ; ^ ? ^ :^:V••• •'-
L3B42JSouth Quail Kollov'Mi/SH?. W 6M0* 
-:/:. Writ eWfrlty Bank of Utah, KA,. 
;V.v?;'Fourth South office ; •'•>;-.: 
' - / ' P . O . Box 720. 8L0. UT SMIO* U : 
// / 
A 
Dep.Bock.^........... Page •••••••••••••••• 
V Mai! tax notice 't&^JJL»u£^^ 
V 
-A' 
A ' . : -.h 
. " • • . - ' * ( , ; 
^ r X : ^ i 
* **" f 
•" :*• fctwt/.*' 
NAGLE COKSTRUCIION COKPAKV 
{CORPORATE FORM] :-X 
i v;. im^u. wajurtumuw lAiRr^x. ••-•;; •••r-;^:' -mr..±\ ;•:*.?•:;•'."•••••- \ .:*v - : :~'\? ., a corporation*.; 
**•? organized arid existing under the laws cf die State of Uta!i, with Its" principal office at?-
-
;
x Salt Lake C i t y - v • • •• :^- , of County of *:y\-i Salt take :••*•:.••:;?.-.?* .•» State of. Utah,4' 
;i;;;grantoi> heKb/CONVEYS AND WARRANTSto;;: v ^ > : . ^ v - v >..- .;; ;*, ;>*;£:.£: 
V^CAMUVKAGLB. 
N""^.'-- grantee, 
for the sum of; 
• ^ v 
iH?"; 11lic"^ of ^ Salt lako Clty f County of Salt take,' State of titeh' :: i* ?r"t?- f  tfi    /.£; .••?: 
:A-> I'; :'f:; TEN DOLLARS ($10,00) and other gooi'en valueble'.considerotierr-y. >•:: KE&fOT,;•;&.II ••.: :
^ / i - I ' -;:~:*eeelpt of m c h l e hereby acknowledged, v : - ^ : ? ^ ; . ; : ; v ^ ^ ^ : > - ^ ^ ^ ^ ' . . - ; ; ^ o ^ v t j . : : ^ 
•r^v-J^v-the following descr i^ 
;%?s|:j"£ .^State of Utah* ^  *:;,v ;^ ^ ^  ^ ^V;: ;.^ :>^ V:". f/^ -: r^  i;-.;^-? ^ ;W ^ ,* V r^':^; v -^.; ,^^^ vT^ 1 ;;J *^ i 
: : r i ^ v - ' A l l ^ 
'•>£• official plat thereof, dated Kay 13, 1976, filed and recorded tey.26, ,1S76,.1n Book 76-5W:;r 
;f::•; at Page 118, records of Salt lake County, State of Utah, v. •: M.J;- AVr-K^ru 
•••"•^ TOGETHER WITH a l l r ights and responsibilities of r.enbershlp 1n the Cove Point Homes As--' --• 
' • / . v s o c l a t l o n , a nonprofit corporation, as 'provided i n the Articles of Incorporation,-Bylaws 
• f: I Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions dated Kay 13,1976, and recorded 1 , 
^ I Kay 26, 1976 1h Book 4212, Pases 277*287, records of Salt take County, and cr.endedjn^:?- : i : ;^:| Book 4451, Page 209 . - - :^v:&*^^^^ ^^\-r^KS^i 
;-:>> SUBJECT TO a l l of the covenants;* restrictions and conditions and easements conta1ned-and •>;.;•:•. 
£ £ < : * e t forth 1n the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions dated Kay:13," 1976?.:£ 
tt'-^end recorded Kay 2 6 , 1 9 7 6 1n Book 4212, Page 2 7 / , and amended In Cook 4 « 1 , Page 2 0 9 ^ :^ /-;;^  
^ • • r e c o r d s of Salt take County,4 Vtthr.^^^Lvz^ 
-•*v '•'-; The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that litis deed and the transfer represented 
.^'thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the. 
:;•• /grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attendedby a quorum. "•-: -"= \ * > :; ' - -v;" V ^;~y; 
:.' In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 







• ' Onthe-"•*••>:-:--->^'--.- ^dayof " : April •.;://• .:- .,-•:.: .1978,^0."-.;•:: S>erwnally appeared before me /•;••..•-; Cory M, JNaB.lp • '•; "
 : • . •
 ;
 •• . • •' , ' ?: 
who being by me duly sworn did lay, each for himself, that he, the aaid Cary H . J ^ i o ^ 
IJ the president, ; ••. ../•. V"--;v, ••>.?•• . ' . : ' V V v . '•- •*"•' • Y : : -: \y^T;t^ Keglo Construction -'.'::-'. v;.>.•*;.•-• .:.>.*•,-.— - ^ 
If the seal of said corporation. 
»• • . - .v * * * 
. , - *?:>'-::.: • 
i-; > ':\ 
I . . I ' * - . ' 
My commisiton cxplrei..u.«.„.?.r^.:.?l .My KiMence !i .....Mt..MR:.6ft>:w;H».*«:-.-
••:.:• :,-i--r. ^.c^./y: VH.-.^K-:- ^:,\<.&ffsi0:-? | W
 ftp CO ~ 111, ,01 ,50lUL^lAkf lAM 
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(^H 
see if the actor or the default that they're declaring occurred 
within the period time and now that we've kind of battled 
through the legal aspects of this case, they're now saying that 
the forfeiture was automatically elected or elected by 
operation - or their inaction of returning the down payment and 
that kind of flies in the face of the 1981 letters which says 
that we're electing the remedy of foreclosure which would 
require a claim anytime after September of 1987. 
Let me briefly look at latches as a defense as well. 
Well, let me back up and address the situation that 
you gave said that if the statute of limitations applies to 
Collard's ability to request title then it also applies to your 
ability to enforce title, we run into a stalemate. I think the 
options that I've given you under the law and the undisputed 
facts, preclude that but the real question is that if we had 
performed back in 1981, and like Mr. Thurman's quotes from 
Kathryn Collard indicate, Mr. Collard said "I did everything I 
was suppose to do. I gave them the stock. I gave them the 
money• I did everything I was suppose to do under that 
contract." He argues that at that point, we had six years to 
then demand title. I believe the court in equity if the 
undisputed facts clearly showed that we paid the money, gave 
the stock and performed under the contract, this Court would 
probably not say, "Gosh, you only had six years to ask for 
title and now I'm not going to give it to you even though you 
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received the full benefit of the performance." I think it's 
pretty clear the Court would be inclined to say, "You got what 
you bargained for. Give them the title." So I don't see that 
as you know, a tit for tat. If the statute applies to one it 
applies to the other. 
THE COURT: Your suggestion then if I find that the 
statute of limitations applies because there was no forfeiture 
and there was a waiver of forfeiture and they're out of luck 
under the contract to enforce the stock provision, then you're 
suggesting that you're entitled to demand title, not because of 
the contract but because of some equitable right in the courts? 
MR. HELSTON: I was just assuming that it they were 
unable to enforce the default that they've declared, what the 
Court is really saying, is you're excusing that non-
performance. I mean the statute of limitations operates to say 
"you had a contract. If you breached it, basically we're 
excusing your failure to perform because the other side has 
failed within the proper period of time to deliver what they 
were suppose to do". I'm just saying as equitable argument, 
it's kind of a stretch to say that if we had performed and we 
can show we performed, that because we didn't act in six years 
we don't deserve title. 
THE COURT: I'm looking for the legal basis that the 
Court can - the legal right from the basis the Court can find 
that you're entitled to title when you didn't enforce your 
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my own brief, and I don't believe it's accurate. I think I 
deserve a chance to just mention it. My argument that 
forfeiture, election of forfeiture is automatically elected 
applies to the fact that this forfeiture was declared in 
September, 1999. It doesn't go back to the argument with 
respect to that forfeiture being automatically declared in 
1981. That's it. 
THE COURT: You get the last word. 
MR. THURMAN: Well, Your Honor, and I think you 
should (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Counsel, I appreciate it. This is a 
rather - I'm sure it's not interesting to the parties, it's 
painful and vexatious, but to the Court it raises some 
questions which are unusual and require some, I think some, 
thought and analysis and clearly there's no clear black letter 
way of ruling on this case. 
It's my view that the stature of limitations applies 
I believe that there the letter in 1981 did not satisfy the 
strict requirements of forfeiture and even were it to do so, I 
think that the conduct of the parties would have indicated a 
waiver so I simply cannot find a basis on which to find 
forfeiture under the facts which I think are undisputed in this 
matter and that leads us to the question that we've been 
discussing, what happens then? And it's my view that there is 
certainly an argument that can be made that out of equity, the 
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Court can require conveyance of title, but I'm not satisfied, 
because the parties were shooting at a lot of different 
targets, that that has been fully addressed from either side, 
so what I'm going to do is limit the issue to that single point 
and invite the parties to further brief that matter and we'll 
have one more argument on this, hopefully to be resolved on 
where it goes. 
But it seems to me the real question is whether I 
have a power of equity, given the fact that I think the statute 
of limitations operates to preclude both sides from exercising 
their rights under that contract. Do I have the equitable 
power given the status of this matter, to order that the title 
be conveyed from Nagle to Collard based on what has happened? 
And there's certainly a lot of support from my view of it but I 
don't know that I'm fully informed about it. 
So let's look at it this way. I think that's the 
argument that you're making now Mr. Helston, so what I'm going 
to ask you to do is file a brief and allow Mr. Thurman to reply 
to that and then you file the reply brief. Let's set a 
schedule and perhaps even a date. I think the parties want to 
get this behind them. 
So how long would it take you to brief me on that 
subject? 
MR. HELSTON: I can have something next Monday. 
THE COURT: Can you get yours the week after that? 
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payments, there was a waiver of that type of performance. 
Number two with respect to the notice of default I 
think we addressed and resolve this last time, but the notice 
said we are going to hold you, you are in default and we are 
going to foreclose it as a mortgage which is the second or 
third remedy under the three available remedies which created 
an ambiguity as to whether or not the person became a tenant at 
will but not withstanding that, they continued to accept the 
performance of the payments on the First Security obligation. 
So, I think clearly the contract can be legally said 
to still be in force with only those stale claims barred and if 
there are any stale claims that we should have raised, barred. 
But I believe that our right - on that issue, our right to 
title and our right to ask for title because of the performance 
of the obligation to First Security still has not accrued and 
will not accrue until the day we finish paying off that 
mortgage or at least can say to them, here is our check for 
$30,000 please bring a deed to the title company so we can 
refinance the loan and I think the order ought to say, you 
know, within so many days of notice, that they would deliver a 
deed to their counsel or to the title company that we direct, 
quit claiming any interest that any of the defendants have in 
the property. I think that addresses the three things raised. 
I'11 submit it. 
THE COURT: Thank you counsel. This is a very 
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perplexing problem. It's unique to the Court's experience and 
doesn't seem to have a lot of precedent behind it. Having now 
heard the argument of counsel and had the benefit of briefing 
and supplemental briefing, I'm going to rule in favor of the 
Plaintiff based on the argument that has been articulated which 
would be that as to the claims that are stale, those claims are 
barred by the Statute of Limitations but that the payments that 
have been made and are current keep, in effect, the contract of 
the parties as modified by the conduct of the parties, namely 
that those payments are the responsibility of the plaintiff and 
as long as they're made, that maintains the underlying 
obligation and that upon the payment off of that obligation, 
then title will be conveyed. 
Mr. Helston, I'd be interested in your preparing some 
findings and conclusions which detail the argument that you've 
successfully made to the Court. It seems like that's the best 
rationale that I've heard as I've listened to both sides. As 
to how this matter needs to be resolved and we think we need a 
clear record on it because of the uniqueness of it, it may well 
be subject to some question. Thank you. We'll be in recess. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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On Monday, July 17, 2000, the Court heard oral argument from counsel for Plaintiff and 
Defendants on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 23, 2000 and on 
Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 29, 2000. The Court then 
ordered further briefing on issues as directed by the Court. After submitting supplemental briefs 
in support and in opposition, a supplemental oral argument was conducted on August 30,2000. 
The Court, having reviewed the all of the pleadings and papers filed herein and having 
heard oral argument from counsel for the parties and considering the undisputed facts in the light 
most favorable to Defendants, is persuaded by the pleadings, points authorities and arguments of 
Plaintiffs counsel and hereby grants summary judgment to Plaintiff and against the Defendants 
and hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
FINDING OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The Court finds the following to be the material, undisputed facts or the facts cast 
in the light most favorable to the Defendants as required by U.R.C.P 56 upon which the Court's 
judgment is based: 
1. The real property at issue in this case is a condominium and land located at 3842 
S. Quail Hollow Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, in the Cove Point condominiums (the "Property"). 
2. On or about March 30, 1978, LeRoy Collard ("Collard") as buyer and Defendant 
Nagle Construction Company ("Nagle Construction") as seller executed a Uniform Real Estate 
i 
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Contract ("Contract") for the purchase of the Property. The stated purchase price for the 
Property was $100,500.00. 
3. The $100,500.00 purchase price was to be paid by Collard by three separate 
actions or installments as follows: 
(1) a down payment of $10,000.00 (hereafter referred to as "Installment 1"); 
(2) assumption of mortgage which was being placed on the Property by Nagle 
Construction in favor of First Security Bank of Utah in the approximate amount of 
$60,000.00 (the "FSB Obligation") (hereinafter referred to as "Installment 2"); 
and 
(3) tender 55,000 shares of the stock of Utah Coal and Chemical Company 
("Stock") to Defendants for the balance of the purchase price of $30,541.26 
(hereinafter referred to as "Installment 3"). 
4. Collard tendered the down payment in satisfaction of the requirements of 
Installment 1. 
5. Collard began making payments on the FSB Obligation directly to First Security 
Bank under Installment 2 but did not refinance the loan in his own name or otherwise remove 
Defendants from the FSB Obligation. 
6. Collard immediately took possession of the Property and recorded a Notice of 
Contract on May 18,1979. 
1
 Mr. Collard's interest in the Property was subsequently transferred to Plaintiff and 
Defendant Nagle Construction's interest in the Property was subsequently assigned to Defendants, 
Gary M. Nagle and Marilyn F. Nagle. 
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7. On or prior to September 18, 1979, Collard tendered the 55,000 shares of Stock to 
Nagle as required by Installment 3 of the Contract. 
8. Mr. Nagle testified that he considered Mr. Collard's failure to fully assume the 
FSB Obligation to be a breach of the Contract 
9. Mr. Nagle further testified that he agreed to forego declaring a default at that time 
because Mr. Collard agreed to pay additional consideration for the Property which agreement 
became Addendum No. 2 to the Contract ("Addendum No. 2"). 
10. Under Addendum No.2, Collard agreed that if the value of the Stock did not reach 
a value of at least $85,000.00 within 1 year, Collard would tender additional shares or cash to 
make up the difference. 
11. Mr. Nagle testified that Addendum No. 2 was executed on or about September 18, 
1979. 
12. Sometime after the expiration of the 1 year period specified in Addendum No. 2, 
on January 13,1981, the law firm of Jensen & Lloyd wrote to a letter to Mr. Collard on behalf of < 
Mr. Nagle alleging Mr. Collard had breached the Contract; specifically the requirements of 
Installment 3, as amended by Addendum No. 2. 
i 
13. Counsel for Defendants declared that if the additional stock or cash was not 
tendered to satisfy the requirements of Installment 3, as amended by Addendum No. 2, prior to 
January 25,1981, Collard would be "deemed by Nagle Construction to be a default thereunder < 
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and will result in the institution of legal proceedings against you for foreclosure of the contract as 
a note and mortgage." 
14. On January 23,1981, attorney Kathryn Collard, daughter of LeRoy Collard, wrote 
a letter to Nagle's counsel informing them that the Stock could have been sold for the required 
$85,000.00 on a number of dates between its delivery and January of 1981, and provided 
brokerage records to support the assertion. 
15. The Court makes no finding regarding the value of the 55,000 shares of Stock 
received by Nagle at any point in time. 
16. Mr. Nagle admits that neither he or his attorneys Walden & Lloyd did anything to 
follow up Mr. Lloyd's January 13,1981 letter. 
17. Mr. Nagle also admitted that no additional agreements or changes to the Contract 
were entered into between Mr. Nagle and Mr. Collard after January 25,1981. 
18. Mr. Nagle retained the 55,000 shares of Stock and the $ 10,000.00 down payment 
made by Collard. 
19. Collard and/or his heirs have continued to make monthly payments on the FSB 
Obligation from 1978 continuing through today the current balance remaining on the FSB 
Obligation is approximately $30,000.00. 
20. In July of 1999, Plaintiff filed a quiet title action in this matter alleging causes of 
action for Breach of Contract, Adverse Possession and Declaratory Relief. 
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21. Subsequent to the letter dated January 13, 1981, declaring Mr. Collard to be in 
default and breach of the Contract, Mr. Nagle took no affirmative legal action to assert a default 
in the Contract until filing the Answer and Counterclaim in this matter in September of 1999. 
22. In September of 1999, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim against 
Collard alleging as causes of action, Forfeiture, Foreclosure and Quiet Title based on Collard's 
alleged breach of the Contract arising out of the events occurring prior to January 25, 1981. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The written Contract in this matter is governed by the six year statute of 
limitations set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-23. 
2. The Contract between Plaintiff and Defendants is a binding, enforceable 
agreement under Utah law. 
3. Collard performed Installment 1 of the Contract. 
4. Defendants' claims and causes of action alleging that Collard breached or 
defaulted on Installment 2 of the Contract, as alleged in the Answer and Counterclaim arose and 
accrued no later than January 25,1981. 
5. After the letter dated January 13, 1981, declaring Mr. Collard to be in default and 
breach of the Contract, Mr. Nagle took no affirmative action to declare a default, elect a remedy 
or otherwise exercise any rights or remedies under the Contract until filing the Answer and 
Counterclaim in this matter in September of 1999. 
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6. Defendants' counterclaim for Forfeiture, Foreclosure and Quiet Title based on 
Collard's alleged default and breach of the requirements of Installment 3 of the Contract (as 
modified by Addendum No. 2) were barred, as a matter of law, no later than January 25,1987. 
Consequently, Defendants' Counterclaims fail as a matter of law. 
7. Defendants' claims and causes of action alleging default and breach of the 
requirements of Installment 3 of the Contract arose and accrued no later than January 25,1981. 
8. Nagle's continued acceptance of Collard's method of performance of Installment 
2 of the Contract, even if a breach of the terms of the Contract, operated as a waiver of the strict 
assumption requirements of Installment 2. Additionally, Collard's manner of performance of 
Installment 2 of the Contract and Nagle's continued acceptance of the tendered performance 
operated to modify Installment 2 to permit direct payments on the FSB Obligation. 
9. Defendants' claims of default and breach of the Contract for Collard' s alleged 
failure to perform Installment 3 were barred or waived, as a matter of law, no later than January 
25,1987. Consequently, Defendants' claims of Forfeiture, Foreclosure and Quiet Title based on 
default and breach of Installment 3 of the Contract as set forth in their Counterclaim fail as a 
matter of law. 
10. The letter from Defendants' counsel dated January 13, 1981, did not satisfy the 
strict notice and procedural requirements to effect a forfeiture under the Contract or Utah law. 
Therefore no forfeiture occurred, and even if it had, the subsequent conduct of the parties 
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operated as a waiver of the forfeiture alleged by the Defendants. Consequently, Defendants' 
election of the remedy of forfeiture fails as a matter of law. 
11. After sending the January 13,1981 letter notifying Mr. Collard of the alleged 
default and electing the remedy of foreclosure, Defendants failed to take any further action to 
foreclose on the Property. Consequently, Defendants' claims and causes of action for foreclosure 
were barred by U.C.A §78-12-23, as a matter of law no later than January 25, 1987. 
12. Each and every cause of action set forth in Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim 
was and is barred by the six year Statute of Limitations set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-23. 
13. Except for the terms or requirements of the Contract, the enforcement of which is 
now barred by the statute of limitations as found by the court above, the Contract remains a valid 
and binding agreement between the parties. 
14. The Plaintiffs right to demand delivery of fee title pursuant to the Contract has 
not arisen and will not arise or accrue until payment of the remaining balance owing on the FSB 
Obligation. 
15. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Plaintiff is entitled to immediate delivery of 





1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 23, 2000 is DENIED. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment against Defendants on Defendants' 
Counterclaim. All claims and causes of action set forth in the Counterclaim are dismissed 
against Defendants with prejudice. 
3. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 29, 2000 on its 
cause of action for Declaratory Relief-Quiet Title is GRANTED and Plaintiff is entitled to 
delivery of fee title subject to and conditioned upon payment of the remaining balance owed on 
the FSB Obligation, subject to the following: 
A. Within 15 business days of the final entry of this Order, Defendants are to 
deliver to an Escrow Agent designated by Plaintiff, a Special Warranty Deed granting and 
transferring the Property to Plaintiff and to provide for a policy of Title Insurance in the 
form and as required by Section 19 of the Contract. 
B. Plaintiff is to tender to the Escrow Agent all funds necessary to pay off the 
FSB Obligation within 10 days of delivery of the Deed by Defendants. 
C. The Escrow Agent shall, upon payment of the remaining balance of the 
FSB Obligation, issuance of the Title Policy and transmittal of confirmation of the same 
to the Parties, release the Deed to Plaintiff for recording. 
D. The Parties shall execute any other and further documents as may be 
required by the Escrow Agent to effect the payment of the remaining balance of the FSB 
Obligation and the transfer of fee title to the Plaintiff. 
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4. Plaintiffs s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment asserting Breach of Contract 
and Adverse Possession is DENIED. 
ORDERED this ^ A H + J U ? "^> , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
By: 
William T. Thurman 
Allan O. Walsh 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IA 
WIEETAM B. BOHLING, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
JX*»1 \ 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, P.C. 
By: 
Bradley R. Helsten 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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